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Motivation
• Left parties have often been viewed by economists (and 
general public) as less “business-friendly”
• Higher taxes (Alesina, 1987; Budge et al., 2001)
• Higher interest rates (Alesina and Rodrick, 1994; 
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Snowberg et al., 2007)
• Stringent labour regulation (Botero et al., 2004; Rueda, 
2005) 
• Strict environmental regulation (Shipan and Lowry, 
2005; Neumayer, 2004;  Budge et al., 2001)
Mixed Evidence
• Mixed academic evidence on the impact of partisanship 
on financial outcomes
• Santa Clara and Valkanov (2003, JF) – significantly higher stock 
returns under Democratic presidencies
• Jacobsen and Stangl (2007) – no presidential cycle in US 
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industry returns. 
• Snowberg, Wolfers, and Zitzewitz (2007, QJE) – higher equity 
prices, interest rates, and US dollar exchange rates under 
Republican presidencies
• Pinto and Pinto (2008) – under left governments, FDI inflows 
have a positive impact on wages
Motivation
• Lack of conclusive evidence is particularly puzzling given 
growing literature on the impact of political uncertainty on 
financial outcomes
Julio and Yook (2012, JF); Boutchkova, Doshi, Durnev, and 
Molchanov (2012, RFS); Pastor and Veronesi (2011, JF)
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• There is a material impact of uncertainty regarding party 
orientation and policies
• However, no consistent evidence that firms perform worse 
under left governments
• Simple test: Compare ROAs in country-years of left and right 
governments
• No significant differences in performance
Motivation
•Why?
1. Not all firms are equally exposed to 
influence of ‘leftist’ policies
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2. Not all ‘leftist’ legislation is enacted 
under left governments
3. Much of the existing literature has 
relied in a ‘left-right’ dummy variable
Our Contribution
1. Explicitly account for the fact that not all industries are 
equally influenced by government partisanship
• Introduce several measures of ‘leftist’ sensitivities
2. Acknowledge the imperfect link between orientation of a 
ruling party orientation and actual policies
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• Perform a two-stage regression. Use policies explained by party 
orientation
3. Account for potential complexities of government 
structures (e.g., coalition governments, legislative and 
executive branches controlled by different parties)
• Create a novel party orientation index
Our Contribution
4. Perform the study in an international context
• Much of the evidence is based on US data
5. Address endogeneity between performance and party 
orientation
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 Aside from “standard” remedies for endogeneity, we create a 
novel instrument of party orientation – commodity resource 
endowment 
 High resource endowment prompts redistributive pressures, 
making left governments more likely
 Note that this instrument is time varying
Political Orientation Sensitivities
• We hypothesize that not all firms are equally affected 
by government ruling party orientation
• Concept of ‘political sensitivities’ has been utilized before. 
• Julio and Yook (2012) – more politically-sensitive industries 
experience sharper drop in investments in election years
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• Boutchkova, Doshi, Durnev, Molchanov (2012) – more labour-
intensive, trade-dependent, and contract-dependent industries 
have higher volatilities in times of high political risk
• Belo, Gala, and Li (2011) – industries more dependent on 
government purchases perform better under Democratic 
administrations
• Large lobbying literature (e.g., Coper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov 
(2010) – stronger positive effect for firms contributing to 
Democrats)
Political Orientation Sensitivities 
(Contribution 1)
• We propose four economic channels of leftist policies 
transmission.
• Sensitivity to labour legislation
• Measured by firms labour intensity as value of labour inputs over the 
total value of production inputs. US data – extrapolated on other 
countries (Similar to the methodology of Rajan and Zingales, 1997, 
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AER).
• US labour laws are actually some of the most lax in developed world
• Sensitivity to tax legislation 
• Measured by EBIT/Sales. Local data.
• Sensitivity to interest rates


















Political Orientation Sensitivities -
Continued
• Four economic channels (continued):
• Sensitivity to environmental legislation
• Measured by environmental category of the Social Corporate 
Responsibility index compiled by MSCI ESG database. Canadian data –
extrapolated on other countries.
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• Canadian environmental laws are relatively lax
• Sensitivity approach reduces omitted variable bias, as 
industries are compared within each country
• Alternative sensitivities are certainly possible
Link Between Party Orientation and 
Policies (Contribution 2)
• It has been traditionally assumed that ‘left’ governments 
are associated with ‘leftist’ policies
• Botero et al, 2004; Rueda, 2005 – more stringent labour legislation. 
• Alesina and Rodrick (1997), among others – higher interest rates. 
• Alesina (1987) – higher taxes.
• Shipan and Lowry, 2001; Neumayer, 2004 – more stringent 
environmental laws.
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• However, left party orientation is not always a good 
predictor of ‘leftist’ legislation (Pagano and Volpin, 2005; 
Bobbio, 1996; Faust and Irons, 1999; Hibbs, 1977) 
• Our solution: employ two-stage least squares estimation 
and employ ‘leftist’ legislation explained (and 
unexplained) by party orientation
Link Between Party Orientation and 
Policies – Continued
• Strength of ‘leftist’ legislation measures are regressed on 
the measure of left party orientation
• Fitted values and residuals are collected and used in the second 
stage regression
• The following policy measures were employed:
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• Rigidity of employment legislation. Source: Doing Business Report 
(World Bank)
• Rigidity of environmental legislation. Source: IMD’s World 
Competitiveness Report
• Corporate tax rate. Source: World Bank
• 90-day real interest rates. Source: WDI (World Bank)
Party Orientation Definition (Contribution 3)
• Most of the existing literature relies on the indicator variable for 
left party orientation
• Currently, US ruling party would be classified as ‘left’, even though 
Congress is Republican
• Richer measures have been developed in political science 
(e.g., Woldendorp et al., 1993), but rarely applied in economics 
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and finance literature (Arin, Molchanov, and Reich, 2012). 
• We employ two alternative measures
• Percentage of seats in legislature held by left parties (Kim and 
Fording, 2002)
• Five-point scale (1 = right, 5 = left). Based on Woldendorp et al. 
(1993), supplemented by Leblang and Mukherjee (2005)
• Raw data obtained from World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions
Party Orientation Definition - Continued
• Five-point scale is defined as follows
1. Presidential system: president is ‘right’ AND controls houses with 
legislative powers. Parliamentary system: chief executive is ‘right’, 
AND government party controls more than 2/3 of the parliament.  
(Right-wing dominance)
2. Presidential system: president is ‘right’ but does NOT control 
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houses. Parliamentary system: chief executive is ‘right’ AND 
government party controls between 1/3 and 2/3 of the parliament.
3. Both systems: chief executive is ‘centrist’.
4. Presidential system: president is ‘left’ but does NOT control 
houses. Parliamentary system: chief executive is ‘left’ AND 
government party controls between 1/3 and 2/3 of the parliament.
5. Presidential system: president is ‘left’ AND controls houses. 
Parliamentary systems: chief executive is ‘left’ AND government 
party controls more than 2/3 of the parliament. (Left-wing 
dominance)
Hypothesis
• We expect firms that are more sensitive to leftist policies 
will perform worse when left parties are in power and 
enact such policies.
• More specifically, labour intensive firms, firms with high 
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gross profit margins firms with higher leverage, and firms 
emitting high quantities of pollutants are expected to 
perform worse and experience lower returns under left 
governments
Data Scope
• Annual industry-level data, 1990 – 2009, 50 countries
• Industries are aggregated  at the three-digit SIC level
• On average, in a given year, the sample contains 126 
industries
• US data obtained from COMPUSTAT/CRSP
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• International data based obtained from OSIRIS
• Control variables included:
• Log of total assets; R&D spending/Total assets; growth in sales
Dependent Variables
•Industry Value
•Measured by Tobin’s Q (market value of equity and 
assets less book value of assets over total assets). 
Source: Worldscope.
•Takes into account current performance as well as 
future growth opportunities.
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•Accounting Performance
•Measured by ROA. Source: Worldscope.
•Reflects realized performance.
•Stock Returns
•Industry value-weighted average of annual firm returns. 
Source: Datastream.
Empirical Specification
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tjitjitji LEFTYSENSITIVITVARDEP ,,,,_ ×⋅+++= βµηα
tjitjititji CONTROLSLEFTYSENSITIVIT ,,,,,,, εγθλ +⋅+⋅+⋅+
Results: A Synopsis
SENSITIVITY
Labour Tax Interest 
Rate
Environm.
Tobin’s Q -0.101*** -0.093 -0.276* -0.013***
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MEASURE Returns -0.027*** -0.078** -0.094** -0.004*
ROA -0.017*** -0.114*** -0.099 -0.010***






Tax rate Real 
interest 
rate
0.031 0.016 3.038 1.122
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Left Party Orientation Index (0.06) (0.10) (0.05) (0.12)
How “Left” is Left?
• Summary of results (policy measures EXPLAINED by 
ruling party orientation)
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SENSITIVITY
Labour Tax Interest Environm.
Rate
MEASURE
Tobin’s Q -0.128*** -0.076* -0.513*** -0.052*
Returns -0.016* -0.045** -0.131*** -0.040**
ROA -0.014 -0.020*** -0.116* -0.009***
Other Results of Note
• Some sensitivity LEVELS are positively related to 
performance measures
• Tax rate sensitivity. Higher tax sensitivity, by definition, signifies 
improved performance
• Environmental sensitivity. ‘Dirtier’ industries minimize costs and 
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increase value.
• Interest rate sensitivity. Highly leveraged industries outperform 
(may use debt to finance positive NPV projects)
• Effects are reversed when left governments are in power
• Sensitivities are detrimental only when they are 
conditioned on political environment
Other Results of Note
• What about stock price reactions to elections of left 
governments (presumably negative)?
• We perform event study around election dates
• When left parties win, CAR(-1,+1) = -1.36%*
• Right parties win, CAR(-1,+1) = 0.75%
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• This is consistent with our expectations
• Winning margin is defined as (% of votes in a winning 
coalition - % of votes for opposition)
• Interaction of ‘left winner’ dummy with winning margin is 
positive and significant
• Wide margin -> No surprise -> No dramatic reaction
Robustness I: Reverse Causality
• Possibility of reverse causality between party orientation 
and firm performance.
• However:
• Differences in firm performances within a country are less likely to 
affect electoral outcomes
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• Explicitly address endogeneity concerns:
1. Control for past economic performance (include a number of 
lagged economic variables)
2. Perform the analysis on sub-samples of presidential and 
parliamentary systems
3. Regress left party indicator on past economic variables and use 
fitted values in interactions
• Preliminary results indicate robustness
Robustness II: Instrumenting Political 
Environment
• Size of labour unions (left parties are more likely to be in 
power when unions are large).
• Resource (oil) endowment
• Left parties are more likely to be in power when pressure for 
redistributive policies is high
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• Country-level resource endowment should not be systematically 
related to differences in industry performance
Instrument is not weak (F-test > 10) and exogenous
Results are also robust when other resources are used as 
instruments
• Preliminary results indicate robustness
Robustness III: Interest Rate Channel
• We expect the impact of left governments to be stronger 
in countries with lower degree of central bank 
independence
• Country-years are ranked by degree of central bank 
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independence
• Analysis is performed on top and bottom quartiles
• Substantially stronger effect for country-years with low 
degree of central bank independence
Robustness IV: Multinational Corporations
• Firms have an option to shift their operations abroad 
through foreign subsidiaries
• Such a shift could be made due to political reasons
• This should work against significance of our findings
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• We calculate industry shares of foreign subsidiary sales
• Positive and significant in most specifications
• This is expected: Less pronounced effect for industries with 
relocation options
• Main results remain robust
Robustness V: Political Connections
• It could be argued that political connections, rather than 
partisanship plays a central role in determining firm 
performance
• Political connections are difficult to estimate in an 
international setting
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• We use state ownership defined as percentage of 
common shares held by the state
• Coefficient on this variable is positive in some 
specifications
• Limited support to the conjecture that state-owned firms are less 
affected by value-destroying policies
• Main results remain robust
Robustness VI: Other issues
• Firms may evade taxes
• Likely that firms with largest tax liabilities will be more actively 
engaged in tax evasion
• Explicitly account for evasion (tax rate times income minus reported 
tax liability)
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• Results remain robust
• Firms may hedge interest rate risk
• Use percentage of firms that use interest rate and exchange rate 
derivatives as an estimate of hedging activity
• Insignificant. Main results remain robust
• Relationship can be different in developed vs. emerging 
economies
• We split the sample. Results hold
CONCLUSIONS
• Despite common view of left parties being less business-
friendly, evidence of firms performing worse under left 
governments is, at best, mixed
• We contribute to the literature by
1. Introducing sensitivities to leftist policies
Addressing the fact that not all ‘leftist’ legislation is enacted by 
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2.
left governments
3. Refining the definition of ‘left’
Party orientation plays a significant role in 
determining firms’ performance!
• Industries more sensitive to leftist policies perform worse 
when left parties are in power and enact such policies.
• Results are robust when endogeneity is addressed
